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Statutory Interpretation Lessons Courtesy of
Pilgrim’s Pride
Philip G. Cohen*
In Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. v. Commissioner, the Fifth Circuit
reversed the Tax Court and held that the taxpayer was entitled to
an ordinary loss deduction from its abandonment of securities.
While the conclusion reached by the Fifth Circuit has been
overshadowed by the promulgation of Treasury Regulation
section 1.165-5(i) that effectively treats an abandoned security as
worthless and thus characterizes the loss as capital, the case
remains noteworthy because it provides an opportunity to
examine the statutory interpretation of two distinct Internal
Revenue Code sections, section 165(g)(1) and section 1234A. The
article focuses on what methods of statutory construction should
have been utilized to determine the application of these sections
to the Pilgrim’s Pride fact-pattern.
Ordinary loss treatment for an abandoned security seems
conceptually incorrect when both a worthless security and a sale
of the security for a de minimis amount would generally result in
a capital loss. The article analyzes whether, and if so, under what
theory did the courts deciding Pilgrim’s Pride possess the
statutory authority to treat the abandonment as a capital loss.
Furthermore, assuming the courts had such authority, the article
considers whether it was proper to do so under the particular
factual circumstances surrounding this case.

*
Associate Professor of Taxation, Pace University Lubin School of Business; Retired
Vice President-Tax & General Tax Counsel, Unilever United States, Inc.; New York
University, B.A., 1971; Duke University School of Law, J.D., 1974; New York University
School of Law, LL.M.(Labor Law), 1975; LL.M. (Taxation), 1982; George Washington
University, M.B.A., 1979. The author would like to thank Michael Schler and Professor
Richard Kraus for their helpful comments on an earlier draft and his graduate teaching
assistant, Huirong (Helena) Tang for her assistance with the article. All errors or omissions
are his own.

1

2

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1

There are a variety of statutory construction methodologies each
with erudite proponents making very persuasive contentions.
Applying an Internal Revenue Code section to a particular factpattern, however, it can often be wiser not to be wedded to one
approach, e.g., textualism. Instead, it is submitted that employing
disparate methodologies depending on the particular
circumstances may be sounder. Pilgrim’s Pride provides a focal
point for examining statutory interpretation methodologies and
illustrating the foregoing. As such, reflecting on the case has
continuing relevance despite the widespread application of
Treasury Regulation section 1.165-5(i) to the abandonment of
securities.
As demonstrated by the different approaches that I believe were
proper here for considering the applicability of sections 165(g)(1)
and 1234A to Pilgrim’s Pride, distinct circumstances require
discrete approaches to applying a statutory provision to a case.
Our democratic institutions are not put at risk, by foregoing
dogmatic textualism where this would lead to a result wherein “no
conceivable tax policy . . . supports this interpretation” or
deeming, in the case of section 165(g)(1), an abandoned security
to be per se worthless. Restraint, however, from deviating from
the clear language of the text, such as applying section 1234A to
inherent rights, may be in order where there are no overriding
reasons not to do so.
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INTRODUCTION

In Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. v. Commissioner,1 the Fifth Circuit reversed
the Tax Court and held that the taxpayer was entitled to an ordinary loss
deduction from its abandonment of securities. While the conclusion
reached by the Fifth Circuit has been overshadowed by the promulgation
of Regulation section 1.165-5(i)2 that effectively treats an abandoned
security as worthless and thus characterizes the loss as capital, reflecting
on the case remains noteworthy because it provides an opportunity to
examine the statutory interpretation of two distinct Internal Revenue Code
sections, section 165(g)(1) and section 1234A. The article focuses on what
methods of statutory construction should have been utilized to determine
the application of these sections to the Pilgrim’s Pride fact-pattern.
Ordinary loss treatment for an abandoned security seems conceptually
incorrect when both a worthless security and a sale of the security for a de
minimis amount would generally result in a capital loss. The article
analyzes whether, and if so under what theory did the courts deciding
Pilgrim’s Pride possess the statutory authority to treat the abandonment as
a capital loss. Furthermore, assuming the courts had such authority, the
article considers whether it was proper to do so under the particular factual
circumstances surrounding this case.
With respect to section 165(g)(1), the issue, which was eschewed by
the Tax Court, was whether a court should consider an abandoned security
having objective value as being worthless. There was an absence of any
evidence that Congress contemplated such treatment and the regulation
mandating such an outcome was not effective for the year in question.
Furthermore, there was a revenue ruling and court decisions that could be
interpreted, at least by analogy as precedent for an ordinary loss.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, per se capital loss characterization for an
abandoned security, absent taxpayer reliance on guidance from the
Service, is both logical and consistent with sound public policy.
Section 1234A is a provision described by one author as
“cumbersome”3 and whose existence might not survive tax reform of
derivative instruments.4 For both section 165(g)(1) and section 1234A, the
Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. v. Comm’r, 779 F. 3d 311 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’g 141 T.C. 533
(2013).
2
See Abandonment of Stocks or Other Securities, 73 Fed. Reg. 13,124 (Mar. 12, 2008)
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
3
See David J. Roberts, Law Treating Certain Terminations as Sales Needs
Clarification, 150 TAX NOTES 337 (2016).
4
The Modernization of Derivatives Tax Act of 2016, S. __, introduced in May 2016 by
Senate Finance Committee ranking minority member Ron Wyden (D-OR) would, if
enacted, repeal section 1234A. It would have also been repealed under the legislation
proposed a few years ago by then House Ways and Means Committee Chair Dave Camp
1
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article seeks to examine what were the appropriate methodologies for
construing the respective provisions in connection with the abandonment
of a security.
By way of background, generally, the sale or exchange of a capital
asset for a loss is treated as a capital loss.5 Capital losses are only allowed
to a corporate taxpayer to the extent of capital gains,6 although such capital
losses can be carried back three taxable years and forward for five taxable
years if there is insufficient capital gain in the year of the capital loss.7
Section 165 (a) sets forth a general rule permitting a deduction for
losses “not compensated for or by insurance or otherwise.”8 Treasury
Regulation section 1.165-2(a) specifies in pertinent part that
A loss incurred in a business or in a transaction entered
into for profit and arising from the sudden termination of
the usefulness in such business or transaction of any nondepreciable property, in a case where such business or
transaction is discontinued or where such property is
permanently discarded from use therein, shall be allowed
as a deduction under section 165(a) for the taxable year in
which the loss is actually sustained.9
Pursuant to Treasury Regulation section 1.165-2(b), however,
Treasury regulation section 1.165-2(a) is not applicable “to losses
sustained upon the sale or exchange of property.”10
Treasury regulation section 1.165-1(b) provides in pertinent part that
To be allowable as a deduction under section 165(a), a
loss must be evidenced by closed and completed
transactions, fixed by identifiable events, and, except as
otherwise provided in section 165(h) and § 1.165-11,
relating to disaster losses, actually sustained during the
taxable year.11

(R.-MI). See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, Technical Explanation, Estimated Revenue
Effects, Distributional Analysis, and Macroeconomic Analysis of the Tax Reform Act of
2014, A Discussion Draft of the Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means to
Reform the Internal Revenue Code, JCS-1-14, at 281-293 (2014).
5
See I.R.C. § 1222 (2014).
6
See I.R.C. § 1211(a) (2012).
7
See I.R.C. § 1212(a) (2012).
8
I.R.C. § 165(a) (2012).
9
Treas. Reg. § 1.165-2(a) (2014).
10
Treas. Reg. § 1.165-2(b) (2014).
11
Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b) (2014).
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The requirement for a “closed and completed” transaction is met, as
the Service observed in Revenue Ruling 2004-58, when the “taxpayer . . .
show[s] both (1) an intention to abandon the asset, and (2) an affirmative
act of abandonment.”12 The Service conceded that the taxpayer in
Pilgrim’s Pride satisfied these requirements.13
The amount of the loss should equal to the taxpayer’s basis in the
security.14 Thus, ignoring the character of the loss, the taxpayer should
have realized a $98.6 million loss in the abandoned securities equal to its
basis.
Section 165(g)(1) provides as a general rule for capital loss treatment
in the case of a worthless security stating that “(i)f any security which is a
capital asset becomes worthless during the taxable year, the loss resulting
therefrom shall, for purposes of this subtitle, be treated as a loss from the
sale or exchange, on the last day of the taxable year, of a capital asset.”15
A security is defined for this purpose to mean
(A) a share of stock in a corporation; (B) a right to
subscribe for, or to receive, a share of stock in a
corporation; or (C) a bond, debenture, note, or certificate,
or other evidence of indebtedness, issued by a corporation
or by a government or political subdivision thereof, with
interest coupons or in registered form.16
In 2008, the Treasury Department promulgated Regulation section
1.165-5(i), which provides that an abandoned security is deemed worthless

Rev. Rul. 2004-58, 2004-1 C.B. 1043 (2004).
Opening Brief for Respondent at 16, Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. v. Comm’r, 141 T.C. 533
(2013).
14
Section 165(b) provides that “[f]or purposes of subsection (a), the basis for
determining the amount of the deduction for any loss shall be the adjusted basis provided
in section 1011 for determining the loss from the sale or other disposition of property.”
I.R.C. § 165 (2014).
15
IRC § 165(g)(1) (2014). Thus, by deeming “a sale or exchange” to occur a necessary
element for capital loss treatment under § 1222(10), is met. While not germane to Pilgrim’s
Pride, as noted, section 165(g)(1) only applies if the security is a capital asset. For example,
it would be inapposite if the taxpayer were a dealer and held the security in its inventory.
See I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1). Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(b) provides that “[i]f any security which is
not a capital asset becomes wholly worthless during the taxable year, the loss resulting
therefrom may be deducted under section 165(a) as an ordinary loss.” A major exception
to the general rule of § 165(g)(1), is contained in § 165(g)(3) addressing securities in
affiliated corporations. If the requirements of that section are met, the loss is an ordinary
loss because the security is deemed not to be a capital asset. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(b)
(2014).
16
See I.R.C. § 165(g)(2) (2014).
12
13
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and thus generally comes within the capital loss rule of section 165(g)(1).17
The regulation is legally inapplicable to Pilgrim’s Pride because it is
effective only to abandonment of stock or other securities after March 12,
2008.18
Ignoring both Treasury Regulation section 1.165-5(i) and the potential
applications of sections 1234A or 165(g)(1), the latter two of which if
pertinent would furnish the requisite “sale or exchange” treatment
necessary for a net capital loss,19 the abandonment of a security would
generally give rise to an ordinary loss because of the lack of consideration
received regardless of whether the security is a capital asset. As was
observed by the Tax Court in La Rue v. Commissioner, “[t]he touchstone
for sale or exchange treatment is consideration.”20
If either section 1234A or section 165(g) were determined to be
applicable to an abandonment of a security, then section 165(f) would
come into play. Section 165(f) addresses capital losses providing that that
“[l]osses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed only to
the extent allowed in sections 1211 and 1212.”21
Section 1234A deems the requisite “sale” treatment for capital gains
and losses to occur for certain transactions. Specifically, this includes
generally the “[g]ain or loss attributable to the cancellation, lapse,
expiration, or other termination of – (1) a right or obligation . . . with
respect to property which is (or on acquisition would be) a capital asset in
the hands of the taxpayer . . . .”22 Had the Tax Court’s holding in Pilgrim’s
Pride been affirmed, i.e., that section 1234A was applicable to an
abandonment of the securities in question, the taxpayer would be denied
an ordinary loss, but could avail itself of a capital loss pursuant to section
Abandonment of Stocks or Other Securities, 73 Fed. Reg. 13,124 (Mar. 12, 2008).
The regulation was initially proposed in 2007. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(i), 72 Fed.
Reg. 41468 (July 30, 2007).
18
Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(i)(2) (2014).
19
See I.R.C § 1222(10) (2014).
20
La Rue v. Comm’r, 90 T.C. 465,483 (1988). While not relevant to the taxpayer’s factpattern, there are instances where an abandonment is a sale or exchange because
consideration is received. Pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a), if abandoned property
results in the taxpayer being relieved of liabilities, taxpayer would generally be treated as
receiving consideration and thus regarded as a “sale or exchange.” In Yarbro v. Comm’r,
737 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1984), reh. denied, 742 F.2d 1453 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1189 (1985), the taxpayers abandoned property for the sole purpose of avoiding further
property taxes and mortgage payments when the fair market value was exceeded by the
outstanding debt. The Fifth Circuit held that even when the abandoned property contained
only non-recourse debt, the loss was properly characterized as a capital loss because “an
abandonment that is deemed to bring in return relief from a nonrecourse debt is a sale or
exchange.” Id. at 487.
21
I.R.C. § 165(f) (2014).
22
I.R.C. § 1234A (2002).
17
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165(f) assuming it had sufficient capital gain to allow the loss to be
utilized. 23
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit, concluded that section 1234A (1) was
inapposite because it determined that the section “only applies to the
termination of contractual or derivative rights, and not to the abandonment
of capital assets . . . .”24 The taxpayer’s predecessor had rejected $20
million offered to redeem certain securities it held, opting instead to
abandon the securities and it expected obtain a $98.6 million ordinary loss.
This was worth considerably more than $20 million that had been
proposed by the issuer. In Tax Court, the taxpayer and the Service initially
“focused their arguments on whether the abandonment caused the
securities to become ‘worthless’ making the loss a capital loss . . . .” 25 The
Tax Court, however, requested briefs on whether section 1234A applied
and ultimately decided that it did.26 The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed
the Tax Court and found section 1234A to be inapplicable to an
abandonment of a security.27 The Court of Appeals also concluded that
that the Service’s alternative argument that capital loss treatment was
mandated by section 165(g)(1) to be erroneous.28
There are a variety of statutory construction methodologies each with
erudite proponents making very persuasive contentions. Applying an
Internal Revenue Code section to a particular fact-pattern, however, it can
often be wiser not to be wedded to one approach, e.g., textualism. Instead,
it is submitted employing disparate methodologies depending on the
particular circumstances may be sounder. Pilgrim’s Pride provides a focal
point for examining statutory interpretation methodologies and illustrating
the foregoing. As such, reflecting on the case has continuing relevance
despite the widespread application of Treasury Regulation section 1.1655(i) to the abandonment of securities.

As noted above, in the absence of sufficient capital gains in the year of the capital
loss, corporations can carry back net capital losses to three preceding years and carry
forward such losses for five years. I.R.C. § 1212(a) (2010).
24
Pilgrim’s Pride v. Comm’r, 779 F.3d 311, 312 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’g 141 T.C. 533
(2013).
25
Id. at 313.
26
Id.
27
Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. v. Comm’r, 779 F. 3d 311 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’g 141 T.C. 533
(2013).
28
Pilgrim’s Pride, 779 F.3d at 317-18.
23
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II. PILGRIM’S PRIDE V. COMMISSIONER
A.

The Tax Court Decision

The background to the case is as follows. The taxpayer is Pilgrim’s
Pride Corporation. In 1998, a predecessor of the taxpayer, Gold Kist Inc.
(“GK Co-op”) sold its agriculture services business to Southern States
Cooperatives, Inc. (“Southern States”) for $255 million for cash and
assumption of certain liabilities.29 In order to finance the acquisition,
Southern States obtained a bridge loan that was secured by a commitment
letter between Southern States and GK Co-op.30 Pursuant to this
commitment letter, Southern States had a period of time to raise $100
million through a public offering.31 Under this arrangement, if Southern
States failed to undertake the offering within the time provided, Southern
States could elect to require GK Co-op to purchase certain Southern State
securities.32 As a result, “on October 5, 1999, GK Co-op purchased 40,000
shares of Step-Up Rate Series B Cumulative Redeemable Preferred
Stock . . . of Southern States for $39.2 million and 60,000 shares of StepUp Rate Capital Securities, Series A . . . issued by . . . [Southern States
Capital Trust I, a Delaware statutory trust established by Southern States]
for $59.4 million.”33 The aggregate total of these securities (collectively
referred to as “Securities”) was $98.6 million. The Securities met the
definition of securities in section 165(g)(2).34
The Securities “generally provided for quarterly dividend payments
that under certain circumstances could be unilaterally deferred by
Southern States.”35 Southern States began deferring dividends on the
Securities in 2002.36 In 2004, Southern States offered to redeem the
Securities for less than what GK Co-op had paid.37 GK Co-Op’s proposal
of $31.5 million was rejected by Southern States, which countered $20
million.38 At that time, i.e., 2004, “GK Co-op was planning to merge with
and into its wholly owned subsidiary . . . and to take the company

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 537, n. 4.
Pilgrim’s Pride, 779 F.3d at 312.
Opening Brief for Respondent at 4, Pilgrim’s Pride v. Comm’r, 141 T.C. 533 (2013).
Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 537, n.4.
Id. at 535-36 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 537.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 537.
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public . . . .”39 It also wanted “to remove [the Securities] . . . from its
balance sheet before making the public offering.”40
In May 2004, GK Co-op’s Board of Directors determined that the best
course of action was to reject Southern State’s $20 million offer and
instead abandon the Securities.41 The Board did this based on its belief that
the tax benefit of an ordinary loss of $98.6 million far exceeded the $20
million offered by Southern States.42 On June 24, 2004 GK Co-op
irrevocably surrendered the Securities to the issuers for no consideration.43
It recorded a $38.8 million loss on its financial statements, which was at
the time the value recorded by GK Co-op on its financial statements
prepared in accordance with GAAP.44 It claimed an ordinary loss of $98.6
million on its 2004 federal tax return.45
The Service in 2009 issued a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer on
grounds that the loss was a capital loss and the taxpayer subsequently filed
a petition in the Tax Court.46 The taxpayer’s position was that section
165(g) should be inapplicable because the securities had value when they
were abandoned.47 The Service asserted that the abandonment should be
treated as a deemed sale pursuant to section 165(g) and as such should be
characterized as a capital loss.48 The Tax Court then issued a sua sponte
order requesting briefs as to whether section 1234A was applicable and, if
so, it would be a capital loss from the abandonment.49
As noted, Section 1234A provides in pertinent part that
Gain or loss attributable to the cancellation, lapse,
expiration, or other termination of—(1) a right or
obligation . . . with respect to property which is (or on
acquisition would be) a capital asset in the hands of the
taxpayer . . . shall be treated as gain or loss from the sale
of a capital asset.50
The taxpayer contended, “that under section 1234A a right or
obligation with respect to property refers only to a contractual or other

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 537-38.
Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 537-38.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 539.
Opening Brief, supra note 31, at 19- 20.
Opening Brief for Respondent, supra note 13, at 14-21.
Pilgrim’s Pride v. Comm’r, 779 F.3d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 2015).
I.R.C. § 1234A (2002).
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derivative right to property and not property rights inherent in the
ownership of the property.”51 The Tax Court rejected the taxpayer’s
assertion holding “that that the plain meaning of the phrase ‘a right or
obligation . . . with respect to property’ encompasses the property rights
inherent in intangible property as well as ancillary or derivative
contractual rights.”52 In support of its position, the Tax Court reasoned that
“[i]n its everyday usage the phrase ‘rights with respect to property’
includes the rights inherent in the ownership of the property, including
stock.”53 Furthermore, the Tax Court noted that “[m]ost significantly,
Congress has used the phrase ‘with respect to property’ in other provisions
of the Code to include rights arising out of the ownership of the property
or characteristics of the property.”54
The Tax Court also rebuffed the taxpayer’s contention:
[T]hat the legislative history to the 1997 amendment of
section 1234A [including no example of a termination of
direct stock ownership] shows that Congress intended that
section 1234A apply only to contractual and other
derivative rights and obligations with respect to property
and not to the inherent property rights and obligations
arising from the ownership of the property.55
The Tax Court’s response to the taxpayer’s assertion was that “we do
not think that the examples do more than show that section 1234A applies
broadly to derivative contractual rights and obligations as well as inherent
property rights.”56 The Tax Court also observed that “the Senate Finance
Committee was critical of the existing law because it taxed similar
economic transactions differently . . . .”57 The court indicated that “[t]he
intended effects [made by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997] of extending
section 1234A to all types of property that are capital assets ‘would be to
remove the effective ability of a taxpayer to elect the character of gains
and losses from certain transactions . . . .’”58 The Tax Court also noted that
an example in the legislative history involving the redemption of a bond is
Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 542.
Id. at 544.
53
Id. at 543.
54
Id. at 544 (citing §§ 126(e), 704(c)(1)(A), 772(c)(3)(A), 877A(h)(1)(A), 954(i)(4)(A),
301(a), and 993(a)(1)(E)).
55
Id. at 545. Pursuant to The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Congress amended section
1234A(1) by replacing the phrase “personal property (as defined in section 1092(d)(1)”
with the term ‘“property.” Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1003(a), 111 Stat. 788, 909-910 (1997).
56
Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 547.
57
Id. at 548.
58
Id.
51
52
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further support for its position because “a bond which, like a share of
stock, is intangible property--a bundle of contractual rights.”59
The Tax Court also rejected the taxpayer’s claim that amendments
made in 2008 to Treasury Regulation section 1.165-5, promulgating
Regulation section 1.165-5(i),60 evidences that the Department of Treasury
did not then subscribe to the belief that section 1234A was applicable to
the abandonment of securities.61 Treasury Regulation section 1.165-5(i),
as noted above, provides in pertinent part that “[i]f the abandoned security
is a capital asset and is not described in section 165(g)(3) . . . the resulting
loss is treated as a loss from the sale or exchange . . . of a capital asset.” In
its dismissal of the taxpayer’s contention, the Tax Court stated that “the
regulation does not create an exception to section 1234A; it is the more
specific provision of section 165(g)(3) that creates an exception for
affiliated corporations. Thus, [Treasury Regulation] section 1.165-5(i) . . .
gives effect to, and is consistent with, section 1234A . . . .”62
Finally, the Tax Court rejected the taxpayer’s assertion that the
Commissioner’s failure to revise Revenue Ruling 93-80,63 after the
amendments to section 1234A under the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,64
constitutes further support for its position that the provision is inapposite
to the abandonment of securities. Revenue Ruling 93-80 holds that “[a]
loss from the abandonment or worthlessness of a partnership interest will
be ordinary if there is neither an actual nor a deemed distribution to the
partner . . . .”65 The Tax Court stressed that the ruling “was issued four
years before section 1234A was amended in 1997 to apply to all property
that is (or would be if acquired) a capital asset in the hands of the
taxpayer.”66 Furthermore, the Tax Court commented that the Service “is
not required to assert a particular position as soon as the statute authorizes
such an interpretation, whether that position is taken in a regulation or in
a revenue ruling.”67
The Tax Court never addressed the applicability of section 165(g)(1)
to Pilgrim’s Pride. The taxpayer filed a motion for reconsideration, which

Id. at 547.
Abandonment of Stocks or Other Securities, 73 Fed. Reg. 13,124 (Mar. 12, 2008) (to
be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
61
Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 549.
62
Id.
63
Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239 (1993).
64
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1003(a), 111 Stat 788, 909-910
(1997).
65
Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239 (1993).
66
Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 550.
67
Id.
59
60
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was denied.68 The taxpayer subsequently appealed the Tax Court decision
to the Fifth Circuit.

B.

The Fifth Circuit Decision

On appeal, the decision of the Tax Court was reversed and the Fifth
Circuit concluded that section “1234A(1) only applies to the termination
of contractual or derivative rights, and not to the abandonment of capital
assets . . . .”69 The Court of Appeals observed that section 1234A was
enacted as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198170 to address
tax straddles, which it defined as “transactions in which taxpayers acquire
offsetting contractual positions to obtain tax benefits without any
economic risk.”71 The Fifth Circuit cited to an example in the legislative
history wherein the “taxpayer simultaneously enter[ed] into a contract to
buy German marks for future delivery and a contract to sell German marks
for future delivery with very little risk.”72 Congress was concerned that
under pre-section 1234A law, in the event of a decline in the price of
German marks, taxpayer would cancel his obligation to buy the marks
achieving an ordinary loss and obtain capital gain treatment from
assigning his contract to sell the marks.73
The Fifth Circuit pointed out that the Service had conceded that
section “1234A does not directly apply to the abandonment of a capital
asset itself.”74 The Court of Appeals then rejected the Service’s assertion
that section 1234A “indirectly applies to the abandonment of a capital
asset because the abandonment of a capital asset involves the termination
of certain rights and obligations ‘inherent in’ those assets.”75 The Fifth
Circuit indicated that “Congress does not legislate in logic puzzles . . . .”76
The Court of Appeals quoted from the Supreme Court that it must “assume
that ‘the ordinary meaning of [statutory] language accurately expresses the
legislative purpose.”77
The Fifth Circuit also noted that the Service failed to identify “any
other statute referring to so-called ‘inherent rights, as ‘rights[s] or
obligation[s] with respect to a capital asset.’”78 Furthermore, the Court of
Pilgrim’s Pride v. Comm’r, 779 F.3d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 312.
70
The Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub L. No. 97-34, § 507(a), 95 Stat. 172, 333
(1981).
71
Pilgrim’s Pride, 779 F.3d at 314.
72
Id. at 315 (citing S. Rep. No 97-144, at 171 (1981).
73
Id. at 314-15 (citing S. Rep. No. 97-144, at 171 (1981)).
74
Id. at 315 (emphasis from the original).
75
Id. (emphasis from the original).
76
Pilgrim’s Pride v. Comm’r, 779 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2015).
77
Id. (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc, 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009)).
78
Id.
68
69
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Appeals maintained that the Service had not cited any case that had
interpreted section “1234A(1) –or any similarly worded statute—in the
manner . . . [it] proposes.”79
As the final nail in the coffin to the Service’s contention regarding
inherent rights, the Fifth Circuit commented that its argument would
render section 1234A(2) “superfluous.”80 Section 1234A(2) provides for
capital gain or loss treatment with respect “to the cancellation, lapse,
expiration, or other termination of . . . (2) a section 1256 contract . . .
which is a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer.”81 The Fifth Circuit
indicated that “the termination of any Section 1256 contract which is a
capital asset would terminate those inherent rights and obligations . . . As
a result § 1234A(2) would not serve any function.”82
The Court of Appeals also dismissed the alternative argument put
forward by the Service that section “165(g) requires Pilgrim’s Pride’s
abandonment loss to be treated as capital.”83 The Fifth Circuit observed
that the Service’s position was irreconcilable with earlier decisions that it
had rendered. The Court of Appeals quoted Echols v. Commissioner that
“[p]roperty cannot be treated as worthless for tax purposes if at the time it,
objectively, has substantial value.”84 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals
commented that in a second Fifth Circuit decision that involved the same
taxpayer, the court had stated that “[w]orthlessness and abandonment are
separate and distinct concepts and are not, as urged by the Commissioner,
simply two sides of the same coin . . . .”85

II.

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOME STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
METHODOLOGIES

In Pilgrim’s Pride, the courts faced two provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code, section 165(g)(1) and section 1234A, neither of which
clearly address the tax consequence of an abandonment of a security and
the strong possibility that the issue wasn’t even considered when the
provisions, or in the case of section 165(g)(1), its predecessor, was
Id.
Id. at 316.
81
I.R.C. § 1234A (2012).
82
Pilgrim’s Pride, 779 F.3d at 316. The Court of Appeals notes in a footnote that the
Service’s interpretation of § 1234A is also inconsistent with two administrative actions by
the Service. First, that Rev. Rul. 93-80 allowed an ordinary loss on the abandonment of a
partnership interest, and second, that Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(i) provides that an abandoned
security is per se worthless resulting in a capital loss under § 165(g)(1). Id. at 317, n. 8.
83
Id. at 317.
84
Id. (quoting Echols v. Comm’r, 935 F.2d 703, 707 (5th Cir. 1991).
85
Id. (quoting Echols v. Comm’r, 950 F.2d 209, 211 (5th Cir. 1991).
79
80
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enacted. Under these circumstances, how should a court interpret the
meaning of these sections with respect to the issue at hand, i.e., the
character of a loss upon the abandonment of a security having objective
value? In this respect, it may be worthwhile to consider what some
scholars have said about statutory interpretation and then to reflect on
some methodologies for addressing the problem.
The late Professor Edward H. Levi, who served as Dean of the
University of Chicago Law School, President of the University of
Chicago, and Attorney General of the United States, wrote about judges
that “[w]e mean to accomplish what the legislature intended . . . The
difficulty is what the legislature intended is ambiguous.”86 In United States
v. Klinger, Judge Learned Hand commented that
When we ask what Congress ‘intended,’ usually there can
be no answer, if what we mean is what any person or
group of persons actually had in mind. Flinch as we may,
what we do, and must do, is to project ourselves, as best
we can, into the position of those who uttered the words,
and to impute to them how they would have dealt with the
concrete occasion. He who supposes that he can be certain
of the result is the least fitted for the attempt.87
Professor Michael Sinclair observed that “[s]tatutory reasoning is the
process by which a statute is brought to bear on a particular set of facts.
Statutes are verbal formulations of some generality. Judicial decisions are
particular. Therein lies the difficulty.”88
The Supreme Court set forth in United States v. Quality Stores, Inc.
that “[t]he beginning point [for applying a statute to particular case] is the
relevant statutory text.”89 What, if any, the next steps should be is in some
dispute. Professors Noel B. Cunningham and James R. Repetti wrote that
“[s]cholars have identified four methods of statutory interpretation that
courts have used: intentionalism, purposivism, textualism, and the

EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 30 (2013, originally
published 1949).
87
United States v. Klinger, 199 F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1952), aff’d per curiam, 345 U.S.
979 (1953).
88
MICHAEL SINCLAIR, GUIDE TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 17 (2013).
89
United States v. Quality Stores, Inc. 134 S.Ct. 1395, 1399 (2014). The Supreme Court
has also stated that “[s]tatutory construction must begin with the language employed by
Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately
expresses the legislative purpose.” Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S.
189, 194 (1985).
86

2017]

PILGRIM'S PRIDE

15

practical reason (or dynamic) method.”90 Professors Cunningham and
Repetti describe intentionalism as an approach that
[S]eeks to determine what the legislature intended the
statute to mean by examining committee reports and floor
statements by sponsors. This method . . . reflects a view
that in interpreting a statute, a court acts as the agent of
Congress. Under this view, it is appropriate to consult
legislative history, even where the statutory language is
clear, to insure that the interpretation does not conflict
with the legislature’s intent . . . .91
In comparison, “t]he purposivist . . . does not inquire what the
legislature intended the statute to mean, but rather asks what the statute’s
purpose was as the time of enactment in order to interpret the statute in a
manner consistent with that purpose.”92 According to Professors
Cunningham and Repetti, the key distinction one makes between
intentionalism and purposivism
[I]s that while the intentionalists try to determine what the
legislature’s intent actually was at the time of enactment,
the purposivists try to determine what the statute would
have meant at the time of enactment when read by a
reasonably intelligent and informed reader.93
To accomplish this objective, the purposivist also considers legislative
history.94
There is some dispute among the scholars as to what role legislative
history should play in statutory construction and what constitutes valid
legislative history for this purpose. According to Bradford L. Ferguson,
Fredric W. Hickman, and Donald C. Lubick, in their article, Reexamining
the Nature and Role of Tax Legislative History in Light of the Changing
Realities of the Process, “[l]egitimate tax legislative history, insofar as it
is explicit and specific, should be considered as having virtue parity with
the statute itself.”95 Among their arguments for deference to legislative
Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX
REV. 1, 7 (2004).
91
Id. at 7-8 (footnotes omitted).
92
Id. at 8 (footnote omitted).
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Bradford L. Ferguson, Fredric W. Hickman & Donald C. Lubick, Reexamining the
Nature and Role of Tax Legislative History in Light of the Changing Realities of the
Process, 67 TAXES 804, 823 (1989). They defined “[l]egitimate [tax] legislative history”
to “include . . . expressions of congressional intent set forth, in substantially similar forms,
90
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history in federal taxation is that the Internal Revenue Code is the
“lengthiest, most complex, most internally interrelated statute on the
books today”96 and that tax legislative history is “much more focused and
comprehensive than legislative history in nontax areas.”97
In contrast to the first two approaches, i.e., intentionalism and
purposivism, “[t]he textualist . . . eschews all legislative history,
considering it highly suspect.”98 Professors Cunningham and Repetti note
that “[t]he textualist looks to the statute’s language and other sources to
identify the text’s meaning.”99 A major proponent of textualism, or more
aptly originalism,100 the late Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in his concurring
opinion in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co. that
in both the Ways and Means and Finance Committee reports, in the Statement of the
Managers issued with respect to a conference report, or in orchestrated floor colloquies
involving the respective bill managers.” Id. They contrast this with post enactment
explanations such as the Joint Committee on Taxation’s Blue Book. See also, e.g., United
States v. Woods, 134 S. Ct. 557 (2013) where Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, stated
with respect to consideration given Blue Books that
Blue Books are prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation as commentaries on recently passed tax laws. They are
‘written after passage of the legislation and therefore d[o] not inform
the decisions of the members of Congress who vot[e] in favor of the
[law]’ . . . . We have held that such ‘[p]ost-enactment legislative
history (a contradiction in terms) is not a legitimate tool of statutory
interpretation.’ . . . .While we have relied on similar documents in the
past, . . . our more recent precedents disapprove of that practice. Of
course the Blue Book, like a law review article, may be relevant to the
extent it is persuasive.
Id. at 568; but see Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts and the Code: Legislative
History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 885-86 (1991).
Professor Livingston maintained
[t]here is no clear line between contemporaneous and subsequent
commentary on a tax bill . . . the Blue Book appears to be on similar
ground with the committee reports: both are unenacted expressions of
intent that are persuasive to the extent they explain the constitutionally
enacted statute and less persuasive when they exceed this function.
Id. at 885-86 (footnote omitted).
96
Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts and the Code: Legislative History and the
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819 (1991).
97
Id.
98
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 90, at 8 (footnote omitted).
99
Id.
100
Justice Scalia espouses “originalism,” which is “the original public meaning of the
text at the time of its enactment.” See Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of
‘Faint-Hearted’ Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 9 (2006). The reference in the title of
the article was Justice Scalia’s comment in an earlier lecture that “I hasten to confess that
in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist. I cannot imagine myself, any more than
any other federal judge, upholding a statute that imposes the punishment of flogging” even
though it was not considered “cruel and unusual punishment” in 1791, i.e., at the time the
Eighth Amendment became part of the Constitution. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The
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The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be
determined, not on the basis of which meaning can be
shown to have been understood by a larger handful of the
Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of which
meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary
usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by
the whole Congress which voted on the words of the
statute (not to mention the citizens subject to it), and (2)
most compatible with the surrounding body of law into
which the provision must be integrated—a compatibility
which, by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always
has in mind.101
Justice Scalia and Brian A. Garner in their book, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts, asserted that “[a] system of democratically
adopted laws . . . makes no sense . . . without the belief that words convey
discernible meanings and without the commitment of legal arbiters to
abide by those meanings.”102
A court employing textualism “is not limited to examining the text of
the statute, itself, and related statutes, but may also consult various textual
authorities existing at the time of enactment, such as dictionaries, case law,
and possibly treatises.”103 Justice Scalia declared that the textualist should
pursue “‘objectified’ intent-the intent that a reasonable person would
gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the
corpus juris.”104

Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989). Justice Antonin Scalia and Professor Bryan
Garner gave an example of and the rationale for “originalism” as follows:
If you want to understand now what Queen Anne was saying about St.
Paul’s Cathedral, you do not ask what the phrase awful, artificial, and
amusing means today. That alone is reason enough for using
originalism to interpret private documents. But where public
documents—constitutions, statutes, ordinances, regulations—are at
issue, there is a still more important reason: Originalism is the only
approach that is compatible with democracy.
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 82 (2012) (emphasis in original).
101
Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J. concurring)
(emphasis in original).
102
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, supra note 100, at xxix.
103
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 90, at 9 (footnote omitted).
104
ANTONIN SCALIA, COMMON-LAW COURTS IN A CIVIL-LAW SYSTEM: THE ROLE OF
UNITED STATES FEDERAL COURTS IN INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, IN A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). Justice Antonin Scalia and
Professor Bryan Garner advised judges that when they interpret legislation they engage in
“(1) giving effect to the text that lawmakers have adopted and that the people are entitled
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Professors Cunningham and Repetti averred that “the ascendancy of
textualism has had its greatest impact by facilitating the promotion and
sale of ‘abusive’ tax shelters.”105 They were concerned that “textualism
permits the attorney to ignore or reduce the importance of legislative
history that would argue against the desired tax results [and that] . . .
textualism challenges the validity of applying various judicial doctrines to
complex statutory provisions.”106
The fourth methodology, cited by Professors Cunningham and
Repetti, i.e., practical reasoning or dynamic interpretation, was developed
by Professors William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey.107 According
to Professors Cunningham and Repetti, this approach “holds that all three
foundational methods are not only flawed but also do not reflect what the
courts actually do.”108 Professors Cunningham and Repetti point out that
this approach “does not reject the foundational methods per se, but rather
‘refuses to privilege intention, purpose or text as the sole touchstone of
interpretation.’”109 Professors Eskridge and Frickey opine that a court
should
[L]ook at a broad range of evidence -- text, historical
evidence, and the text’s evolution -- and thus form a
preliminary view of the statute. The interpreter then
develops that preliminary view by testing various possible
interpretations against the multiple criteria of fidelity to
the text, historical accuracy, and conformity to
circumstances and values. Each criterion is relevant, yet
none necessarily trumps the others.110
Professor Eskridge in a later work indicated that the focus of the court
should be
[N]ot only what the statute means abstractly, or even on
the basis of legislative history, but also what it ought to
mean in terms of the needs and goals of our present day
society . . . sometimes the circumstances will be
to rely on, and (2) giving no effect to lawmakers’ unenacted desires.” Scalia & Garner,
supra note 100, at 29.
105
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 90, at 20.
106
Id. at 62.
107
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990).
108
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 90, at 9 (citing Eskridge & Frickey, supra note
107, at 321-22).
109
Id. (quoting Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 107, at 345).
110
Id. at 9-10 (citing Eskridge &. Frickey, supra note 107, at 352).
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materially different from those contemplated by the
statutory drafters, and in that event any application of the
statute will be dynamic in a strong sense, going against
the drafters’ expectations, which have been negated
because important assumptions have been undone.111
Other academics have used different terms for dividing the universe
of statutory interpretation methodologies. For Professor William D.
Popkin, a noted income tax as well as statutory construction scholar, there
are two approaches, “pragmatism” and “anti-pragmatism.”112 He indicated
that “in one camp are the pragmatists who view judging as a lawmaking
partnership with the legislature.”113 He referred to Seventh Circuit Judge
and prolific author Richard A. Posner and Professor Eskridge as “the best
known advocates of pragmatic judging.”114
Judge Posner defined his version of “a pragmatic approach to the law”
as asking “judges to focus on the practical consequences of their
decisions . . . .”115 With respect to interpreting the Constitution, in
criticizing textualism, Judge Posner commented that “[l]ike most judges,
Supreme Court Justices prefer in their opinions to remain on the semantic
surface of issues, arguing over the meaning of malleable terms such as
‘public use’ or ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ rather than over the
consequences of adopting one meaning over another. Trying to decide
what a term means by staring at it is a form of naval gazing.”116
Professor Popkin notes that “the anti-pragmatists reach their
conclusions by very different routes.”117 He writes that “[Justice Antonin]
Scalia and [Harvard Law School Professor John] Manning are textualists
who rely on various arguments that the Constitution prevents the judge
from being a pragmatic lawmaking partner.”118 According to Professor
Popkin, other anti-pragmatists include Harvard Law Professor Einer
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 50 n.7 (1994)
(quoting Arthur Phelps, Factors Influencing Judges in Interpreting Statutes, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 456, 469 (1950)).
112
WILLIAM D. POPKIN, THE JUDICIAL ROLE: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION & THE
PRAGMATIC JUDICIAL PARTNER xi-xii (2013).
113
Id. at xi.
114
Id. In an earlier work, Professor Popkin advocated a “collaborative model of statutory
interpretation.” William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 543 (1988).
115
Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term Foreword: A Political Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. 31, 90 (2005) (footnote omitted).
116
Id. at 98-99. At least with respect to the application of pragmatism to Constitutional
interpretation, he advocates the Supreme Court should be “restrained in the exercise of its
power.” Id. at 102.
117
Popkin, supra note 112, at xii.
118
Id.
111
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Elhauge, who “adopts a version of intentionalism—what he calls judicial
deference to ‘enactable preferences,’ stressing democratic values.”119
Professor Popkin is firmly in the pragmatists school for construing a
statute. He “argues that pragmatic judicial partnering is both descriptively
accurate and normatively desirable. It describes and justifies judging as a
creative act of judgment rather than discovery of the right answer in the
text, legislative intent, or in a decision about policy consequences.”120
Professor Popkin asserted that this style of judging which is “persuasion
through the transparent judicial opinion that acknowledges indeterminacy
and the potential relevance of policy considerations” is superior to the
alternative.121
Professor Paul R. Caron, another noted tax law scholar, splits the
statutory interpretation world into three groups: “intentionalism”,
“purposivism” and “new textualism.”122 He writes that
Under the traditional intentionalism approach, legislative
history is used in conjunction with the statutory text to
divine the legislative intent behind a particular provision.
In contrast, the purposivism approach, as formulated by
Professors Hart and Sacks, seeks to construe a statute in
light of the goals the legislature had in mind when it
enacted the statute. Finally, the new textualism approach
of Judge Easterbrook and Justice Scalia places primary
emphasis on the literal language of the statute.123
Professor Caron was critical of “[s]ome courts and commentators
[that] have seized upon . . . [the tax law’s] complexity and the nature of
the tax legislative process to justify approaches to statutory construction
that differ from those employed in construing nontax statutes.”124

Id. Another leading anti-pragmatist Professor Popkin indicates is Harvard Law
Professor Adrian Vermeule, who “is a literalist who does not base his approach on
constitutional or democratic values. He instead relies on an institutional model of judging
that emphasizes the more or less certain costs and uncertain benefits that judges encounter
in trying to find the right answer . . . .” Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 81.
122
Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax
Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 540 (1994).
123
Id. (footnotes omitted) (referring to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (10th ed.
1958); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary
Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581 (1989-90)).
124
Id. at 531.
119
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Another noted tax expert, Professor Lawrence Zelenak, has promoted
the position that in construing a statute, “[t]he statutory context may
clearly indicate that the only sensible, logical interpretation is a nonliteral
interpretation. If this is the case, the nonliteral interpretation should be
regarded as the statute’s meaning.”125 He maintained that “[n]onliteral
interpretations are justified primarily, if not exclusively, when a statute
must be applied to fact patterns that Congress did not consider when it
enacted the statute.”126
Professor Michael Livingston indicated he “would go further than
[Professor] Zelenak”127 in stressing the importance of context in
interpreting an Internal Revenue Code provision. Professor Livingston
stated “that contextual interpretation is not only appropriate in individual
tax cases, but is in fact the dominant approach—and properly so—to tax
interpretation.” 128 He commented that “[f]ew if any tax terms have a
‘plain’ meaning that can be divorced from the statutory and decisional
context in which the terms arise.”129 Professor Livingston asserted that
contextual interpretation “in many respects follows the Hart and Sacks
approach, identifying the underlying purpose of the statute and
interpreting individual provisions consistently with that purpose.”130 He
argued that legislative history has a vital role but that “[c]ourts [should] . . .
restrict legislative history to its proper explanatory function . . . .”131 He
counselled against a court “refus[ing] to consider any legislative history,
or, at the opposite extreme, if they seek to reconstruct the legislative
process in deciding each tax case.”132

III.
A.

OBSERVATIONS

Section 165(g)(1) and Abandonment of Securities

Had Regulation section 1.165-5(i) been promulgated prior to the
abandonment of the Securities in 2004, this would have been an easy case
for the courts to decide assuming the taxpayer continued to challenge
Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Revenue
Code, 64 N.C.L. REV. 623, 637 (1986).
126
Id. at 659 (footnote omitted).
127
Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts and the Code: Legislative History and the
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 830 (1991).
128
Id. at 830-31.
129
Id. at 831.
130
Id. at 829.
131
Id. at 886.
132
Id. (advising Congress that they could assist the judiciary “by providing more of the
‘why’ and less of the ‘how’ in the legislative history”).
125
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capital loss treatment. The courts should and presumably would utilize the
test set forth for deference to the judgment of an administrative agency by
the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,133 i.e., “whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left
open by Congress”134 and conclude the regulation met the test. Because
the regulation was legally ineffective for the 2004 transaction, the courts
faced a much more difficult but more thought-provoking exercise that
required an analysis of the applicability of section 165(g)(1) and section
1234A. That is, should either section 165(g)(1) or section 1234A be
interpreted as obligating the taxpayer to treat the loss as a capital loss?
Prior to the promulgation of Treasury regulation 1.165-5(i), there was
certainly support, including both a revenue ruling as well as decisions in
the Fifth Circuit, for the view that an abandonment of a security should be
treated as an ordinary loss. Nevertheless, even prior to the effective date
of Treasury Regulation section 1.165-5(i), a logical argument, consistent
with some of the methodologies employed in statutory interpretation, can
be made that a taxpayer, such as Pilgrim’s Pride should not be accorded
ordinary loss treatment under section 165(a) upon abandonment of
securities, when a sale for the offered $20 million or any amount, no matter
how small (but less than basis) would have resulted in a capital loss. That
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
134
Id. at 866. The often-quoted two-prong test for deference in Chevron is:
[f]irst, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court
is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute.
Id. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted). The other frequently cited passage from Chevron on
deference is that “legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. at 844 (footnote omitted).
In Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44,
45 (2011), the Supreme Court indicated this standard also applied to Treasury Department
interpretative regulations. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Research v. United States at
45. It should be noted, however, that on June 8, 2016, the House Judiciary Committee
reported out H.R. 4768, the Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, which, if
enacted, according to a statement at the markup, by the Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, Rep. Robert “Bob” Goodlatte (R-VA) would “legislatively overturn . . . the
Chevron doctrine.” On July 12, 2016, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 4768.
The House of Representatives passed a similar provision contained in the Regulatory
Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 5, on January 11, 2017.
133
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is, section 165(g)(1) should be read to treat an abandoned security as
worthless.
The case for this position is that had it focused on the issue when
section 165(g)(1) and its predecessor was enacted, Congress would find,
or at least should find, that ordinary loss treatment for an abandoned
security, even if it has objective value prior to its abandonment, to be a
“peculiar and anomalous result.”135 The policy rationale behind section
165(g)(1), i.e., that a taxpayer should not be accorded ordinary loss
treatment when a security becomes worthless, but obtain a capital loss if
the security is sold or exchanged for a de minimis amount of consideration,
equally applies to a security abandonment. It makes no sense that a
taxpayer can obtain a better tax treatment, i.e., ordinary loss vs. capital
loss, by abandoning a security rather than by selling or exchanging it.
Certainly, construing the statute in such a manner, i.e., an abandoned
security is deemed worthless because it has no remaining value to the
taxpayer, would be consistent with “conformity to contemporary
circumstances and values.”136
As discussed above, on its face, Treasury Regulation section 1.1655(i) is not effective for Pilgrim’s Pride since this regulation only applies
prospectively, consistent with section 7805(b), “to any abandonment of
stock or other securities after March 12, 2008.”137 Courts have refrained
from applying a regulation prior to its effective date.138 This does not mean
that a court should be oblivious to the policy issues raised by the
regulation.
As noted, one argument that abandoned securities should come within
section 165(g)(1) and thus give rise to a capital loss is that by the taxpayer
abandoning the securities, the securities have become worthless to it. That
is, an abandoned security should be treated as per se worthless for purposes
of section 165(g)(1). While the decisions involve different legal issues and
concern the abandonment of a partnership interest and not a security, there
The language “peculiar and anomalous results” was cited in the Proposed Rulemaking
for Prop. Reg. § 1.165-5(i) as follows:
[t]he legislative history of the predecessor of section 165(g) indicates
that the provision was enacted to remove the ‘peculiar and anomalous
results’ that followed from treating losses from the worthlessness of
securities as ordinary losses or deductions, and losses from the sale or
exchange of securities as capital losses, because both losses represent
a loss of capital in a transaction entered into for profit. See H. Rep. No.
1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., at 18-19 (1938).
72 Fed. Reg. 41468 (proposed July 30, 2007) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
136
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 90, at 10 (citing Eskridge & Frickey, supra note
107, at 352).
137
Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(i)(2) (2008).
138
See, e.g., Hunter v. Comm’r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1143 n.3 (2004).
135
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is certainly somewhat adverse precedent to this position by the Fifth
Circuit in Echols v Commissioner (referred to by the Fifth Circuit in
Pilgrim’s Pride and hereinafter as “Echols II”)139 and its predecessor
(referred to hereinafter as “Echols I”).140 In Echols II, as quoted by the
Fifth Circuit in Pilgrim’s Pride, the court said “[w]orthlessness and
abandonment are separate and distinct concepts and are not, as urged by
the Commissioner, simply two sides of the same coin . . . .”141
In Echols II, the Fifth Circuit’s denied the Service’s petition for a
rehearing requesting that the Fifth Circuit withdraw its original “alternate
holding [in Echols I] that the taxpayers were entitled . . . to take a loss
deduction under Code § 165(a) based on their determination, grounded in
demonstrable facts, that their interest in the partnership was
‘worthless.’”142 The Court of Appeals rejected the Service’s position
“which, if accepted, would totally subsume ‘worthlessness’ in
‘abandonment.’”143
In Echols I, the Fifth Circuit set forth that “a property cannot be treated
as worthless for tax loss purposes if at the time it, objectively, has
substantial value.”144 This obviously undermined the argument that an
abandoned security having real worth prior to its abandonment can be
considered worthless for purposes of section 165(g)(1). This was cited by
the Fifth Circuit in Pilgrim’s Pride for its rejection of the Service’s
alternative argument that “a security becomes ‘worthless’ when it is
‘useless’ to its owner, regardless of its market value.”145
In Echols I, the taxpayers (John C Echols and his wife Deanna O.
Nichols) owned an interest (initially 37.5% but later 75%) in a Texas
See, Echols v. Comm’r, 950 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1991).
Echols v. Comm’r, 935 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1991).
141
Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. v. Comm’r, 779 F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Echols,
950 F.2d at 211).
142
Echols, 950 F.2d at 210.
143
Id. at 211 (indicating that “the Commissioner would have us hold that there can be no
loss deduction under Code § 165 without either a transfer of title or an act of
abandonment . . . . Despite the Commissioner’s wishful thinking to the contrary, taxpayers
are entitled to take loss deductions under Code § 165(a), not only for assets that the
taxpayer has abandoned, with or without their having become worthless, but also for assets
that have become worthless, with or without having been abandoned.”).
144
Echols, 935 F.2d at 707.
145
Pilgrim’s Pride, 779 F.3d at 317; see Reply Brief of Appellant at 22, Pilgrim’s Pride
Corp. v. Comm’r, 779 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-60295)(emphasis in original)
(citing to Boehm v. Comm’r, 326 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1945); Genecov v. United States, 412
F.2d 556, 560-61 (5th Cir. 1969); Miami Beach Bay Shore Co. v. Comm’r, 136 F.2d 408,
409 (5th Cir. 1943)) (citing several additional cases in support of its argument that
“securities must be both objectively and subjectively worthless to be considered worthless
for purposes of section 165(g),” however the cited cases do not address the factual situation
present in Pilgrim’s Pride).
139
140
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limited partnership whose only asset was a tract of unimproved real estate
in Houston, Texas. A third party developer (hereinafter, “the Developer”)
also had an interest in this land. In 1976, the Developer defaulted on a
payment owed for this land when its value had declined, and John Echols
called a meeting of the partners, at which time he indicated he would no
longer contribute funds needed for the mortgage and ad valorem payments
due on the land. Eventually the land was foreclosed upon.
Near the outset of its analysis with respect to the character of the
taxpayers’ loss, the Fifth Circuit in Echols I stated that there was an
important
[D]istinction
between
‘abandonment’
and
‘worthlessness’; either concept can, under proper
circumstances, justify a deduction pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 165(a), but each is different in theory, and the elements
of one are separate and distinct from the elements of the
other.146
The Fifth Circuit, in Echols I determined that the taxpayers were
entitled to a loss deduction under section 165(a) on the basis of
abandonment of their interest in the partnership as well as on the basis of
worthlessness.147
The Service itself has recognized that abandonment and worthlessness
are not always coterminous in that something can be worthless even
though not abandoned. In Revenue Ruling 54-581, the Service held that if
property became worthless in a prior year, “the taxpayer may not, by
subsequent act of abandonment establish a deductible loss for the year of
such abandonment.”148 Treasury Regulation section 1.165-2(a) reiterates
this point by providing that “the taxable year in which the loss is sustained
is not necessarily the taxable year in which the overt act of abandonment,
or the loss of title to the property, occurs.”149
In Citron v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held that an abandonment
of a partnership interest resulted in ordinary loss.150 The Tax Court
observed that the court had “not, under the 1954 or later versions of the
Internal Revenue Code, decided whether abandonment of assets
(including partnership interests), where no partnership liabilities exist,
results in ordinary, rather than capital, loss.”151 The Tax Court commented,

146
147
148
149
150
151

Echols, 935 F.2d at 706.
Id. at 709.
Rev. Rul. 54-581, 1954-2 C.B. 112
Treas. Reg. § 1,165-2(a).
Citron v. Comm’r, 97 T.C. 200, 200-01 (1991).
Id. at 215.
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however, that it had decided “in the context of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939 . . . that abandonment (forfeiture) of a partnership interest was not
a sale or exchange and could be accorded ordinary (rather than capital)
loss treatment.”152 The Tax Court, furthermore, noted “[n]o changes were
made in the loss provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which
would dictate a change in the case precedent under the 1939 Code.”153 It
also pointed out that “[t]here is limited precedent, in other courts, under
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 that the worthlessness of a partnership
interest (a capital asset) may result in an ordinary loss.”154
Revenue Ruling 93-80,155 like Echols decisions and Citron, also
involved the abandonment and worthlessness of a partnership interest. The
ruling examined two fact-patterns, one involving a deemed distribution to
the taxpayer partner, in a situation, in which the partnership had
nonrecourse liabilities in which the taxpayer partner shared and another in
which the taxpayer limited partner “did not bear the economic risk of loss
for any of the partnership liabilities in the basis of the partnership
interest . . . [and] did not receive any money or property upon leaving the
partnership.”156 While the Service concluded that the first fact-pattern
resulted in a capital loss because “a deemed distribution” is made to the
taxpayer partner in question, it determined that in the second situation, the
taxpayer partner was entitled to an ordinary loss “because . . . [the partner]
did not receive any actual or deemed distribution from the partnership.”157
While the Fifth Circuit in Pilgrim’s Pride did not cite Rev. Rul. 93-80, and
it did not involve an abandonment of a security, it too is arguably
supportive of taxpayer’s ordinary loss argument.
Notwithstanding Revenue Ruling 93-80, the decisions in Echols and
Citron, the Service was not dissuaded from arguing in Pilgrim’s Pride that
a disposition of securities through abandonment resulted in a capital loss.
The Service cited Proesel v. Commissioner158 in support of its position that
“an act of abandonment is an identifiable event that reflects the
worthlessness of the property at that point to petitioner and fixes the
loss.”159 Proesel is not a very persuasive precedent for this position. There
is merely dicta in Proesel, a case involving taxpayer’s worthless loss claim
Id. at 213.
Id.
154
Id.
155
Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239. Abandonment losses were also discussed in a later
revenue ruling. Rev. Rul. 2004-54, 2004-1 C.B. 1043 (discussing whether there were
effective acts of abandonment with respect to several factual situations relating to motion
picture rights, although the ruling has limited applicability to the issues in Pilgrim’s Pride).
156
Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239.
157
Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 241.
158
Proesel v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 992 (1981).
159
Opening Brief for Respondent, supra note 13, at 17.
152
153
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from an involvement in a motion picture project through two layers of
partnerships, that “an abandonment . . . reflect[s] the fact that the property
is worthless.”160
Despite the somewhat adverse authority, and Proesel being of limited
support, the Service’s position was far from baseless. While a security or
other property can be worthless, without being abandoned, it does not
necessarily follow that an abandoned security should not by such act alone
not be deemed to be worthless. There is logic to the Service’s assertion
that “the act of surrendering the securities established that they were
worthless to Gold Kist . . . that the securities were of no ‘use’ or ‘profit’ to
Gold Kist, i.e. useless.”161 The Treasury Department’s Preamble to
Proposed Regulation section 1.165-5(i) stated that
The legislative history of the predecessor of section
165(g) indicated that the provision was enacted to remove
the “peculiar and anomalous results” that followed from
treating losses from the worthlessness of securities as
ordinary losses or deductions, and losses from the sale or
exchange of securities as capital losses, because both
losses represent a loss of capital in a transaction entered
into for profit.162
It would indeed be an anomaly for a taxpayer to be accorded capital
loss treatment if he sells a security bought for $100 for $1 but would be
entitled to an ordinary loss if the same security bought for $100 becomes
worthless. Similarly, it is an anomaly that Pilgrim’s Pride should be in a
better position after tax, by abandoning the Securities in question, than it
would have been if its predecessor accepted the $20 million offered from
Proesel, 77 T.C. at 1005.
Brief for the Appellee at 55, Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. v. Comm’r, 779 F.3d 311 (5th Cir.
2015) (No. 14-60295).
162
Abandonment of Stock and Other Securities, 72 Fed. Reg. 41468 (proposed July 30,
2007)(to be codified at 26 C.F. R. pt.1). Interestingly, the citation provided there, H.R. Rep.
No. 1860, at 18-19 (1938), does not specifically refer to “peculiar and anomalous results.”
Neither does the citation for this language provided for by the IRS Chief Counsel in its
Opening Brief at 14, Pilgrim’s Pride v. Comm’r, 141 T.C. 533 (2013)(No. 12089-10), i.e.,
H.R. Rep. No. 75-2330, at 44-46 (1938). Nevertheless, this language was in fact quoted in
J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS, 19381861, 12 (The Law Exchange, Ltd. 2003), referring to House Ways & Means
Subcommittee Report, H.R. Rep. No. (1938). Section 23 of the Revenue Act of 1938 stated
that
[i]f any securities . . . are ascertained to be worthless and charged off
within the taxable year and are capital assets, the loss resulting
therefrom shall . . . be considered as a loss from the sale or exchange,
on the last day of such taxable year, of capital assets.
Pub. L. No. 75-554, 52 Stat. 447 (1938).
160
161
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Southern States. It is certainly bad public policy to encourage and
subsidize taxpayers like Pilgrim’s Pride to act in such a manner that is
commercially irrational absent tax considerations. While Treasury
Regulation 1.165-5(i) is not effective, courts should not be unmindful of
the policy concerns raised by it. Like a proposed regulation, it is not
entitled to deference prior to its effective date, but as the Tax Court
indicated about proposed regulations, under certain circumstances, “they
can be useful guidelines . . . .”163
In other words, why isn’t it reasonable to follow the premise of
Treasury Regulation section 1.165-5(i), despite its legal inapplicability to
the tax year in question, and determine the worth of the security to be the
subjective value to the taxpayer the second after its abandonment? There
is nothing per se in section 165(g)(1) instructing one not to ascertain a
security’s worth by deeming it to be that of the taxpayer post abandonment
nor any indication that Congress disfavored such an approach. Wouldn’t a
court’s determination that section 165(g)(1) should characterize a security
that is abandoned as worthless to the taxpayer and thus generally a capital
loss be consistent with those who espouse dynamic statutory
interpretation, i.e., what the provision “ought to mean in terms of the needs
and goals of our present day society?”164
I do recognize that the logic of the position that an abandoned security
should be treated as worthless can be arguably challenged as follows.
When someone gifts an item, except in unusual circumstances, it has
value. That is, it would not be considered worthless simply because the
donated property no longer has value to the donor. Why shouldn’t
abandonment be treated similarly, i.e., a gift to the issuer that is not treated
as worthless? I think there is a distinction between these fact-patterns.
With a gift, while generally made out of “out of affection, respect,
admiration, charity or like impulses,”165 the donor presumably receives
non-monetary consideration of value, i.e., the emotional satisfaction of
giving to the donee. In this respect, the donor has retained in a sense
continuing value from the property. This is different from an
abandonment, which, unlike a donation, is done invariably solely, as
exemplified by Pilgrim’s Pride, to obtain a tax benefit. With an

See, e.g., Seawright v. CIR, 117 T.C. 294, 300 (2001) (stating that “they can be useful
guidelines where, as here, they closely follow the legislative history of the statutory
provision in question.”). Id. Pilgrim’s Pride, 779 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2015) (stating that the
final regulations do not follow the legislative history per se except arguably for eliminating
another “anomaly” with loss characterization of securities).
164
Eskridge, supra note 111.
165
See Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (citing Robertson v. United
States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952)).
163
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abandonment, there is no remaining value to the donor, excluding the tax
subsidy.
From the vantage point of a purposivist, construing section 165(g)(1)
as establishing the test of worthlessness of a security to be the subjective
value to the taxpayer post abandonment would be reasonable. The
overarching point of the section was for the “sale or exchange”
requirement for capital loss treatment not to enable a taxpayer to have a
more optimal tax result by having a security become worthless rather than
selling it for a de minimis amount. One does not have to construe the
provision very expansively to apply this same rationale to an abandoned
security, which by such act no longer has any worth to the taxpayer. As
Professor Popkin observed “the statute’s coverage can be extended to
cases not within the text’s plain meaning in order to serve the statute’s
purpose.”166
Craig W. Friedrich, in discussing the reason why Proposed Regulation
section 1.165-5(i)167 was issued, referred to a
[S]tatutory accident [that] created a plain, if not rational,
opportunity for tax planning that the fisc decided, quite
reasonably in my view should not be there. Taxpayers and
their advisors [are] seeking to avail themselves of the
linguistic permission granted by the sale-or-exchange
requirement by abandoning securities . . . .[T]he new
rule . . . [is] giving effect to the legislative intent . . . .168
Friedrich believes that solution crafted, i.e., regulations to be effective
prospectively upon finalization, was the correct way of addressing the
problem.169 I contend that a fact-pattern, like Pilgrim’s Pride, can be
viewed not as “statutory accident” but a situation simply not addressed in
the four corners of the provision and that a court’s “giving effect to the
legislative intent . . .”,170 i.e., the purpose of the statute to address
“anomalies” with respect to characterization of losses in securities, could,
under certain circumstances, be proper.
Would such a result offend a textualist? Perhaps, since there is nothing
in the statutory text that specifically treats an abandoned security having
objective value prior to its abandonment as coming within the reach of
William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL.
L. REV. 541, 604 (1988).
167
Abandonment of Stock and Other Securities, 72 Fed. Reg. 41468 (proposed July 30,
2007) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
168
Craig W. Friedrich, Proposed Regs Make Abandonment of ‘Securities’ Sale-orExchange Under Section 165, 35 CORP. TAX’N 45, 46 (2008).
169
Id.
170
Id.
166
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section 165(g)(1). On the other hand, the statute is silent as to how one
should test for worthlessness.
Absent Revenue Ruling 93-80,171 I believe the courts should have
distinguished Echols I 172 and Echols II173 and other non-security decisions
and treated the taxpayer’s loss to be a capital loss. There is a question,
however, if it would be equitable to do so when the taxpayer undoubtedly
considered the guidance as well as court decisions discussed above when
it undertook the transaction. A taxpayer should be entitled to rely on
published IRS guidance. Revenue Procedure 89-14 provides in pertinent
part “[t]axpayers generally may rely upon revenue rulings . . . in
determining the tax treatment of their own transactions.”174 Revenue
rulings are thus binding on the Service until revoked. The Tax Court has
rebuked the Service for taking a litigating position contrary to a revenue
ruling stating:
[T]he IRS has committed itself “to increased and more
timely published guidance,” in the form of revenue
rulings and revenue procedures, in the hopes of achieving
increased taxpayer compliance and resolving “frequently
disputed tax issues.” These stated goals will not be
achieved if the Commissioner refuses to follow his own
published guidance and argues in court proceedings that
revenue rulings do not bind him or that his rulings are
incorrect. Certainly, the Commissioner’s failure to follow
his own rulings would be unfair to those taxpayers, such
as petitioners herein, who have relied on revenue rulings
to structure their transactions.175
The issue becomes whether a taxpayer could reasonably rely on a
revenue ruling addressing the abandonment of a partnership interest to be
applicable to that of a security. The Service does specifically caveat
revenue ruling reliance stating that “[b]ecause each revenue ruling
represents the conclusion of the Service regarding the application of law
to the entire statement of facts involved, taxpayers . . . are cautioned
against reaching the same conclusion in other cases unless the facts and

Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239.
Echols v. Comm’r, 935 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1991).
173
Echols v. Comm’r, 950 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1991).
174
Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 815, § 7.01(5).
175
See Rauenhorst v. Comm’r, 119 T.C. 157, 183 (2002). In Estate of Delaune v. United
States, 143 F.3d 995, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998), the Fifth Circuit stated “[a]s we recently held
in Estate of McLendon . . . ‘the Commissioner will be held to his published rulings in areas
where the law is unclear, and may not depart from them in individual cases.’”
171
172
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circumstances are substantially the same.”176 In Pilgrim’s Pride, the
taxpayer argued that “the general legal standards described in Revenue
Ruling 93-80177 regarding the abandonment of a partnership interest
should be considered to be equally applicable to the abandonment of stock
because stock, like a partnership interest, is an intangible asset.”178
While Revenue Ruling 93-80179 can be distinguished from Pilgrim’s
Pride, in the absence of other guidance differentiating it from losses from
abandoned securities, it served to undermine its litigating position in
Pilgrim’s Pride. While it is a close question, for me it tipped the scales in
taxpayer’s favor. Had the ruling not been issued or had it been
distinguished from an abandonment of securities, I believe the Service’s
position on this issue should have prevailed. One lasting lesson for the
Service is that if it intends to litigate an issue, it should be very careful
about clarifying published guidance that is at least arguably inconsistent
with the view embraced in court.
As a final point, one can only speculate as to why the Tax Court did
not specifically address the applicability of section 165(g)(1) to the
Pilgrim’s Pride fact-pattern. For one, the court might have believed that it
would serve as a distraction to what it considered was its compelling
analysis of section 1234A. Perhaps, it deemed section 165(g)(1) simply
inapt. It could have been concerned about the precedent set by the Tax
Court in Citron180 and the possible application of the Golsen rule 181 by
virtue of the Fifth Circuit decisions in Echols I 182 and Echols II,183 or that
taxpayer had undertaken the transaction in reliance of Revenue Ruling 9380.184 It would have been helpful, however, at least to legal scholars if the
Tax Court addressed application of the section.185

Rev. Proc. 2016-4, 2016-1 I.R.B. 142, § 3.07.
Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239.
178
Brief for the Appellant at 38-39 (footnotes omitted), Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 779 F.3d
311 (5th Cir. 2015).
179
Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239.
180
Citron, 97 T.C. at 200.
181
Golsen v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742 (1970) (establishing a rule whereby the Tax Court is
bound to follow the decisions of a court of appeals to which a particular case is appealable
to).
182
Echols, 935 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1991).
183
Echols, 950 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1991).
184
Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239.
185
Cf., e.g., Framatome Connectors USA, Inc. v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 32 (2002), aff’d
without published opinion, 108 F. App’x 683 (2d. Cir. 2004) (addressing a Tax Court case
involving whether a foreign subsidiary was a controlled foreign corporation). After first
holding that taxpayer could not prevail because it could not avail itself of the doctrine of
substance over form, the court then spent considerable analysis determining that the
taxpayer would also lose on the basis of the substance of the arrangement.
176
177
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Section 1234A is a conundrum of a provision that given the
circumstance here, I believe, necessitates a different methodology for
statutory interpretation than was advanced above for section 165(g)(1).
Jasper L. Cummings, Jr. commented that
Section 1234A suffers from multiple impediments: It is
too brief, never explained by a regulation (the regulation
proposed in 2004186 is yet to be finalized and does not deal
with the issues addressed here [or in Pilgrim’s Pride], and
located in the region of the code that tends to deal with
derivatives, which causes everyone else to ignore it and
the financial institutions and products folks to believe it
was written just for them. In other words, section 1234A
is a perfect setup for confusion.187
Professor David J. Roberts was also highly critical of section 1234A.
He wrote that “[s]ection 1234A cries out for clarification . . . Whatever
Congress intended, the entire provision was simply not well thought
out.”188 Linda E. Carlisle, in a similar vein, declared that “section 1234A
has increased uncertainty and muddied the treatment of some contract
rights.”189
In Pilgrim’s Pride, both parties and courts embrace the concept of
following the “plain terms”190 and/or “plain meaning”191 of the provision
but not surprisingly, given the enigma of section 1234A, reached different
conclusions. In its brief to the Fifth Circuit, the taxpayer stated, “[w]hen
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1234A-1 (Mar. 29, 2004) covers payments to terminate notional
principal contracts, bullet swaps, and forward contracts.
187
Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Reexamining Capital Gains for Real Estate, 146 TAX NOTES
1409, 1413 (2015). While not directly relevant to the application of I.R.C. § 1234A to
Pilgrim’s Pride, there have been a few recent developments concerning the interpretation
of I.R.C. § 1234A worth noting. In CRI-Leslie, LLC v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. No. 8 (2016),
the Tax Court determined that I.R.C. § 1234A does not apply to section 1231 property. The
IRS also provided guidance that it is now of the opinion that IRC § 1234A resulted in
capital losses to the party that paid termination fees upon the breakup of a planned merger.
See C.A.M. 2016-42035 (Feb. 9, 2016); F.A.A. 20163701F (May 3, 2016). This contrasts
with older guidance by the Service holding that I.R.C. § 1234A does not result in capital
gain treatment to the recipient of a termination fee. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 140872-07
(Mar. 10, 2008).
188
See David J. Roberts, Law Treating Certain Terminations as Sales Needs
Clarification, 150 TAX NOTES 337, 345 (2016).
189
Linda E. Carlisle, Gain or Loss on Termination, in James N. Calvin et al., Examining
the Straddle Rules After 25 Years, 125 TAX NOTES 1301, 1320 (2009).
190
See, e.g., Pilgrim’s Pride, 779 F.3d at 315.
191
See, e.g., Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 542.
186
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the language of the statute is clear on its face, it must be enforced
according to its terms because ‘courts must presume that a legislature says
in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.’”192
The Service also cited the same quote in its brief to the Fifth Circuit, and
followed with a further quote from Connecticut National Bank v. Germain
that “[w]hen the words of a statute are unambiguous, then this first canon
is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”193 While the Tax Court
spent considerable analysis on what it believed to be Congress’ intentions,
it too declared that “[s]tatutes are to be construed so as to give effect to the
plain meaning of the words in the text unless we find that a word’s plain
meaning is inescapably ambiguous”194 and that “where a statute is clear on
its face, we require unequivocal evidence of legislative purpose before
construing the statute so as to override the plain meaning of the words used
therein.”195 The Fifth Circuit, at the outset of its analysis, sets forth its
conclusion that
By its plain terms, § 1234A(1) applies to the termination
of rights or obligations with respect to capital assets (e.g.
derivative or contractual rights to buy or sell capital
assets). It does not apply to the termination of ownership
of the capital asset itself. Applied to the facts of this case,
Pilgrim’s Pride abandoned the Securities, not a “right or
obligation . . . with respect to” the Securities.196
A textualist would be presumably pleased with the Fifth Circuit’s
persuasive analysis. I concur that it was the appropriate methodology in
this instance.
As noted above, the Court of Appeals rejected the Service’s assertion
that section 1234A(1) should be germane to the taxpayer’s fact-pattern on
the basis that ownership of stock by its nature contains inherent rights that
are the subject of section 1234A. The Court of Appeals held that
“Congress does not legislate in logic puzzles, and we do not ‘tag Congress
with an extravagant preference for the opaque when the use of a clear
adjective or noun would have worked nicely.’”197 The Fifth Circuit also
commented that the Service “does not provide us any reason to forego that
Brief for the Appellant, supra note 178, at 13 (citing Connecticut Nat’l Bank v.
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) and United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489
U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989)).
193
Brief for the Appellee, supra note 161, at 21 (citing Connecticut Nat’l Bank v.
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)).
194
Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 542.
195
Id.
196
Pilgrim’s Pride, 779 F. 3d at 315.
197
Id. (citing Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250, 256 (2000)).
192
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assumption”198 that “the ordinary meaning of [statutory] language
accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”199 The Fifth Circuit
concluded that the Service’s construction of the statute was “far too
convoluted to believe Congress intended it.”200
The Fifth Circuit, cited for support, inter alia, lines from a Bible for
textualists and originalists, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts by the late Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan A Garner.201 The Court
of Appeals opined that “[t]he Commissioner’s interpretation of
§ 1234A(1) also would render superfluous § 1234A(2), violating the rule
of statutory interpretation that ‘we are obligated to give effect, if possible,
to every word Congress used.’”202 That is, as noted above, the Fifth Circuit
essentially asked why would it be necessary to enact section 1234A(2) if
the Service’s construction of section 1234A(1) was correct since under
such interpretation “the termination of any section 1256 contract which is
a capital asset would be covered . . . ”203 already by section 1234A(1).
The Court of Appeals was properly dismissive of the Service’s
assertion that section 1234A(2) was not “superfluous because it ensures
that ‘gain or loss from a deemed termination by offset will be treated as
gain or loss from the sale of a capital asset.’”204 The Fifth Circuit’s
reasoned that offsets are included in section 1234 A(1) by virtue of the
words “or other terminations” in the opening line of section 1234A.205
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit correctly concluded that the Service’s
Id.
Id. (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009)).
200
Id. at 316 (citing Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 90 (2001)). It is
interesting to note that the Fifth Circuit’s focus on textualism in construing I.R.C. § 1234A
in contrast to a somewhat more intentualist approach by the Tax Court is consistent with
Professor David F. Shores’ review of tax litigation in the Tax Court and Court of Appeals
between 2000 and 2006, where he concluded that the Tax Court is more likely to be more
receptive to intentionalism theories while the Court of Appeals was found to have generally
embraced textualism. David F. Shores, Textualism and Intentionalism in Tax Litigation, 61
TAX L. 53 (2007). Jasper Cummings recently observed that in the period from 2008- to
2015, while there was “a sharp decline in the number of reversals of Tax Court
interpretations of statutes that the appellate court found to ‘clearly’ have a different
meaning . . . the Tax Court was still on the intentionalist side of the interpretation and the
appellate courts on the literalist side.” Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Trending Literalism in the
Tax Court, 153 TAX NOTES 1461, 1466 (2016).
201
See Note 100, supra at 174. The Fifth Circuit’s quote from the text was: “If possible,
every word and every provision is to be given effect. None should needlessly be given an
interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.”
Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 779 F.3d at 316.
202
Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 779 F.3d at 316 (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,
339 (1979)).
203
Id.
204
Id. (footnote omitted).
205
Id.
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position “would require us to hold that § 1234A(2)’s only purpose is to
address termination by offset, and that Congress chose a remarkably
convoluted way to effectuate that purpose.”206
Why was it proper for the Fifth Circuit to reach its decision vis-à-vis
section 1234A using a textualist approach but this methodology was
unsuitable for construing section 165(g)(1)? I would argue that unlike
section 165(g)(1), except for some legitimate questions about what
Congress intended when section 1234A was amended by the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997,207 there was no compelling policy reason for deviating
from the construing section 1234A in conformity with the plain meaning
of the text. That is, if one examines the intention and purpose of the
provision as well as how it should apply from a policy standpoint by “what
it ought to mean in terms of the needs and goals of our present day
society,”208 including the existence already in the Internal Revenue Code
of section 165(g)(1), there does not seem to be a convincing case that it
should not be deemed to impose a sale on the abandonment of a security.
I am not unmindful of the justifiable concern raised by Professors
Cunningham and Repetti, as well as others, that “[t]he ascendancy of
textualism has had its greatest impact by facilitating the promotion and
sale of ‘abusive’ tax shelters.”209 An example of how utilizing a textualist
methodology can serve to permit a taxpayer to obtain an unjustifiable tax
benefit is the recent Sixth Circuit decision Wright v. Commissioner.210 The
case dealt with section 1256, another section, like section 1234A, enacted
as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981211 that addressed tax
abuse with financial instruments. A textualist approach was employed in
interpreting the statute in a manner that blatantly ignored the policy
concerns of the provision. In Wright, the taxpayers “claimed a large tax
loss by marking to market a euro put option upon the . . . [taxpayers’]
assignment of the option to charity.”212 The Sixth Circuit acknowledged
that the “transactions [undertaken] appear to have allowed the . . .
[taxpayers] to generate a large tax loss at minimal economic risk or outof-pocket expense.”213
Id.
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1003, 111 Stat.788, 909-910
(1997).
208
Eskridge, supra note 111, at 50, n.7.
209
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 90, at 20.
210
Wright v. Comm’r, 809 F.3d 877 (6th Cir. 2016).
211
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, P.L. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
212
Wright, 809 F.3d at 878.
213
Id. The Sixth Circuit, quoting from the Service’s brief, described the tax shelter
strategy utilized in Wright as follows:
The major-minor tax shelter was designed to manipulate the mark-tomarket rules . . . . The taxpayer arranges with a counterparty for four
206
207
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The issue in Wright was whether an over-the-counter option in a major
currency, was a “foreign currency contract” within the meaning of section
1256(g)(2)(A) as taxpayer contended, allowing them to trigger large tax
losses on the-mark-to-market rules of section 1256. The Sixth Circuit
reversed the Tax Court, which had held for the Service. The Sixth Circuit
stated that “the Tax Court’s reasoning [finding section 1256(g)(2)(A)
inapplicable] appears to be supported by sound tax policy, but nonetheless
conflicts with the plain language of § 1256.”214
In reaching its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit rejected the need to
examine the provision’s legislative history,215 and ignored the fact that “no
conceivable tax policy . . . supports this interpretation of the plain
language of § 1256 . . . .”216 This statement presumably would make a
pragmatist, like Judge Posner, cringe. Jasper L. Cummings Jr. was very
disparaging of this statement that Cummings indicated “bragged” about
this ignorance of any tax policy concerns.217 Cummings condemned the
blind textualism employed in Wright with the comment that “if appellate
judges do no more than parse the grammar of statutes, they might as well
OTC [over-the-counter] options. The taxpayer buys from the
counterparty a euro call and a euro put on mirror-image terms. The
taxpayer also sells to the counterparty a krone call and a krone put on
mirror-image terms. The premiums paid to and received from the
counterparty mostly offset each other. Because the call and put for each
currency are mirror images of each other, one will rise while the other
will fall. Because the krone is closely tied to the euro, both calls should
largely offset each other, as should both puts. The taxpayer and the
counterparty then retain their premiums, but the taxpayer assigns to a
charity his rights and obligations under the depreciated euro option and
the appreciated (and offsetting) krone option (i.e., the charity receives
both calls or both puts). The taxpayer asserts that the assignment of the
losing euro option is a recognition event under § 1256(c)(1), and he
invokes the mark-to-market rules to claim a loss . . . . Because [the
taxpayer takes the position that] the krone option is not a § 1256
contract, the taxpayer recognizes gain, if ever, when his obligation to
perform is terminated by the closing or lapse of the option. The
taxpayer and the counterparty then terminate the unassigned options so
that the gain on one offsets the loss on the other. If the taxpayer’s
reading of § 1256 is correct, he receives a large tax loss with minimal
economic risk or out-of-pocket expense. Moreover, because the
options are offsetting and can be settled in dollars, the nominal
amounts of foreign currency can be set well beyond the means of the
parties, so as to generate the tax loss desired by the taxpayer.
Id. at 880.
214
Id. at 882.
215
Id. at 884.
216
Id.
217
Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Are Judges Just English Teachers?, 151 TAX NOTES 1553
(2016).
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be English teachers and not lawyers.”218 The Sixth Circuit clearly did not
adhere to the advice of Judge Posner to “focus on the practical
consequences of their decision . . . .”219
One other aspect of the Wright decision is worth mentioning relating
to a self-inflicted wound on the part of the Service. This is somewhat
comparable to concerns expressed herein regarding both the issuance of
Revenue Ruling 93-80220 without distinguishing guidance until 2007
relating to the characterization of losses upon the abandonment of
securities, as well as the failure to promulgate regulations under section
1234A addressing the issue at hand. While Cummings and others
justifiably criticized the Wright decision,221 the Sixth Circuit was correct
in faulting the Service for the failure to issue regulations “that excludes
foreign currency options from the definition of a ‘foreign currency
contract.’”222 John Kaufmann commented about Wright that
Regardless of the merits of the ‘plain meaning’ argument,
the estoppel argument made by the court near the end of
the opinion seems to be a winner. When Congress passed
the 1982 act, it granted the IRS the authority to issue
regulations interpreting the meaning of the term ‘foreign
currency contract.’ The IRS knew that there was a
difference of opinion regarding the interpretation of the
term, and it had the power to clarify that foreign currency
options do not constitute foreign currency contracts
simply by declaring so in a regulation. The IRS can hardly
complain that it lost a case because it sat on the right to
settle the issue in its favor for 34 years.223
While denying ordinary loss treatment on the abandonment of a
security could and should have been dealt with prior to the effective date
of 1.165-5(i), by a somewhat expansive interpretation of section 165(g)(1),
this was thwarted by the Service’s issuance of Revenue Ruling 93-80224
without other guidance distinguishing it from a security abandonment.
Unlike the partnership provisions that Professors Cunningham and Repetti

Id.
Posner, supra note 115, at 90.
220
Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239.
221
See, e.g., William R Davis, Court Decision Spurs Foreign Currency Option Treatment
Debate, TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 10, 2016).
222
Wright v. Comm’r, 809 F.3d 877, 885 (6th Cir. 2016).
223
John Kaufmann, Sixth Circuit Follows Plain Meaning; Tax Bar Up in Arms, 150 TAX
NOTES 923, 926 (2016).
224
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allude to,225 the ordinary loss on abandonment of securities was not created
by section 1234A, and it should not serve as the proverbial finger in the
dyke when there was, I believe, a more artful method for solving the
problem, absent the Service’s misstep.
In terms of the legislative history to section 1234A, it was enacted in
1981 as part of the provisions addressing tax straddles in the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981.226 As originally enacted section 1234A
provided:
Gain or loss attributable to the cancellation, lapse,
expiration or other termination of a right or obligation
with respect to personal property (as defined in section
1092(d)(1)) which is (or on acquisition would be) a capital
asset in the hands of the taxpayer shall be treated as gain
or loss from the sale of a capital asset.227
The key wording insofar as to whether or not section 1234A should
apply to the abandonment of a security, i.e., “cancellation, lapse,
expiration or other termination of a right or obligation with respect to
property” was never revised. According to the legislative history of the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, section 1234A was enacted because
“the change in the sale or exchange rule is necessary to prevent taxavoidance transactions designed to create fully-deductible ordinary losses
on certain dispositions of capital assets, which if sold at a gain, would
produce capital gains.”228 Congress was concerned that “[s]ome taxpayers
and tax shelter promoters have attempted to exploit court decisions
holding that ordinary income or loss results from certain dispositions of
property whose sale or exchange would produce capital gain or loss.”229
Its target was apparently a limited class of capital assets and transactions
including “ordinary loss and capital gain transactions [that] involve
cancellations of forward contracts for currency or securities.”230
Linda E. Carlisle reflected on the background to section 1234A as
follows:
Before 1981, commodity transactions were used to create
“silver butterflies,” “gold cash-and-carry transactions,”
and “T-bill rolls” to defer and convert ordinary income
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 90, at 20-63.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act, Pub L. No. 97-34, § 507(a), 95 Stat. 172, 333
(1981).
227
Id.
228
H.R. Rep. No. 97-201, at 212 (1981).
229
Id.; see also S. Rep. No. 97-144, at 170 (1981).
230
Id.
225
226
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into capital gains. In June 1980, however, the process of
tax reform in the commodity area began, and the
butterflies began to take flight.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA)
enacted a set of new rules to reform the world of financial
transactions, which at that time consisted mainly of
commodity derivative transactions. ERTA dealt
comprehensively with commodity transactions by
imposing the recognition of losses on straddle positions
under section 1092, requiring regulated futures contracts
to be marked to market under section 1256, requiring the
capitalization of interest and carrying charges for straddle
positions under section 263(g), and settling the
“confusion” that had arisen regarding the treatment of
some contract rights under section 1234A.231
A forerunner to the enactment of section 1234A, was proposed
legislation introduced by Senator Daniel P Moynihan. Senator
Moynihan’s bill, if enacted, would have addressed the character arbitrage
in straddle transactions by incorporating a very broad definition of “sale
or exchange” in section 7701(a) that would have provided that “[t]he term
‘sale or exchange’ when used with reference to any capital asset means
any disposition of such asset.”232 The legislative history does not explain
why Congress chose to address the perceived abuse differently.
There is also a possible disconnect between how both the House Ways
and Means and Senate Finance Committee reports accompanying the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 described the tax loss character
manipulation section 1234A was intended to address and the final
language of the provision. The Congressional reports in describing the
problem indicated that
[A]s a result of these interpretations, losses from the
termination, cancellation, lapse, abandonment and other
dispositions of property, which are not sales or exchanges
of the property, are reported as fully deductible ordinary
losses instead of as capital losses.233

Carlisle, supra note 189, at 1319-20.
Commodity Straddles Tax Act of 1981, S. 626, § 6 (1981).
233
H.R. Rep. No. 97-201, at 212 (1981); see also S. Rep. No. 97-144, at 170 (1981). It
should also be noted that the word “abandonment” was also not included in the group of
actions triggering the operative provision of the section.
231
232
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Nevertheless, section 1234A, as enacted, was more narrowly crafted,
i.e., it only addressed “gain or loss attributable to the cancellation, lapse,
expiration or other termination of a right or obligation with respect to
personal property . . . .”234
There were a number of modifications to section 1234A after 1981
but, very significantly, the term “right or obligation with respect to” was
never altered. Shortly after its enactment, Congress made a technical
correction to section 1234A, adding section 1234A(2), to have it also apply
to “a regulated futures contract (as defined in section 1256) not described
in paragraph (1), which is a capital asset in the hands of the
taxpayer . . . .”235 This change was made in association with a revision to
section 1256 which removed the condition that a contract must require
delivery of “personal property,” as defined in section 1092(d)(1), to be
treated as a regulated futures contract.236 Unlike 1234A(1), Section
1234A(2) as both initially enacted and as written throughout its history
does not refer to “a right or obligation.”237
The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 made further revisions to 1234A.238
With respect the Pilgrim’s Pride fact-pattern, more scrutiny is required as
to the changes made to section 1234A by the Taxpayer Relief Act of
The Economic Recovery Tax Act, Pub L. No. 97-34, § 507(a), 95 Stat. 172, 333
(1981) (emphasis added).
235
Technical Corrections Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-448, § 105(e), 96 Stat. 2365, 2387
(1983).
236
Id. at 2365, 2385.
237
According to Linda Carlyle,
Congress was concerned that those contracts, which settle only in cash,
would not be treated as rights or obligations regarding capital assets
because cash is not a capital asset. The legislative history makes it clear
that capital gain or loss treatment under section 1234A(1) was based
on the termination of contracts with respect to property that is, or on
acquisition would be, a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer.
Carlisle, supra note 189, at 1320. In a recent thought-provoking article on section 1234A,
Professor David J. Roberts raises the question as “[w]hen section 1234A(1) refers to ‘a
right or obligation . . . with respect to property which is (or on acquisition would be) a
capital asset,’ what is supposed to be the capital asset- the right or obligation, or the
property itself?” He answers his question that “[p]resumably it is the property itself . . . .
But how sure are we of this?” See Roberts, supra note 3, at 338.
238
The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984). One
change made was that Section 1234A(2) was amended to delete the phrase “a regulated
futures contract” and replace it with “a section 1256 contract.” Id. § 102(e)(4), 98 Stat. 494,
624 (1984). This was made in connection with section 1256’s amendment to apply to
additional financial contracts. Id. § 102(a)(2), 98 Stat. 494, 620 (1984). Another change
made by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 was the addition of a final sentence, effective
as if included in the original provision, clarifying that section 1234A would “not apply to
the retirement of any debt instrument (whether or not through a trust or other participation
arrangement).” Id. § 102(e)(9), 98 Stat. 494, 625 (1984). The word “arrangement” was
subsequently changed to “agreement.”
234
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1997.239 In 1997, Congress amended Section 1234A(1) by substituting the
phrase “personal property (as defined in section 1092(d)(1)” with the term
“property.”240
The Senate Finance Committee Report, in explaining the reason for
the amendment, stated that it “believes that present law is deficient since
it (1) taxes similar economic transactions differently, (2) effectively
provides some, but not all, taxpayers with an election [as to the character
of the gain or loss], and (3) its lack of certainty makes the tax laws
unnecessarily difficult to administer.”241 The Senate Finance Committee
also pointed out that “some transactions, such as settlements of contracts
to deliver a capital asset, are economically equivalent to a sale or exchange
of such contracts since the value of any asset is the present value of the
future income that such asset will produce.”242
The taxpayer characterized the change as “cover[ing] contractual and
other derivative rights with respect to all types of property, not just
publicly traded personal property.”243 Section 1234A’s scope was
certainly expanded by the 1997 statutory modification. Thus, after this
amendment to the provision, section 1234A(1) was applicable to
“cancellation, lapse, expiration, or other termination of a right or
obligation” of any property, including real property, and non-actively
traded personal property, assuming the property” is (or on acquisition
would be) a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer.” The original
limitation of section 1234A(1) to a “right or obligation with respect to”
such property, was, however, not removed from the provision. That is, the
amendments made in 1997 retained the restriction as to its applicability to
“the cancellation, lapse, expiration, or other termination of a right or
obligation . . . with respect to property which is (or on acquisition would
be) a capital asset . . . .”
Did Congress intend that the amendment would broaden section
1234A(1) to cover the abandonment of a security? It certainly did not
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1003(a), 111 Stat. 788, 90910 (1997).
240
Id.
241
S. Rep. No. 105-33, at 134 (1997).
242
Id.
243
Brief for the Appellant, supra note 178, at 28 (footnote omitted). H.R. Rep, No. 105148 explained that Congress was concerned that
to the extent that present law treats modification of property rights as
not being a sale or exchange, present law effectively provides, in many
cases, taxpayers with an election to treat the transactions as giving rise
to capital gain, subject to more favorable rates than ordinary income,
or ordinary loss that can offset higher-taxed ordinary income and not
be the subject to limitations on use of capital losses.
Id. at 453.
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specifically mention this transaction in the legislative history. There is, I
believe, a legitimate question, as to what exactly Congress envisioned by
the 1997 changes. Did they mean for the section to expand beyond
derivatives? If so, why were the words “right or obligation with respect
to” property retained? Perhaps this was faulty drafting, but alternatively it
is also quite plausible that the scope of its objective was more limited.
In arguing for applying section 1234A to the abandonment of a
security, the Tax Court referred to the fact that the Senate Finance
Committee report cited Fairbanks v. United States,244 where the Supreme
Court held that gain realized on the redemption of bonds before their
maturity was not entitled to capital gain treatment because the redemption
was not a “sale or exchange.”245 The Tax Court stated that “[t]he example
of a redemption of a bond is most significant given that Congress had long
since overturned the result in Fairbanks by enacting the predecessor of
section 1271(a) in the Revenue Act of 1934 . . . .”246 The Service asserted
that “[t]he citation of Fairbanks as an example in the legislative history
demonstrates that Congress was concerned about court decisions
addressing termination of rights inherent in property and not merely
derivative rights.”247 The point regarding Fairbanks is certainly not
unfounded. There is some discrepancy between the legislative history to
the changes made to section 1234A in 1997 and the literal language of the
amended section. Furthermore, there may be justifiable policy reasons for
section 1234A to mandate capital treatment not only for rights and
obligations in securities but for the security itself.
In contrast to the Service’s position, the taxpayer described the
legislative history to the section 1234A amendment to the Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997248 as follows:
The House Committee on the Budget restated some of the
same issues addressed in the legislative history to the
1981 Act, broadly described the sale or exchange
requirement, and then went on to focus specifically on the
termination of contractual interests or the modification of
property rights under contracts where the asset underlying
the contract is a capital asset.249

Fairbanks v. United States, 306 U.S. 436 (1939).
Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 546; see also Brief for the Appellee, supra note 192, at
42-43.
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Id. at 547-48.
247
See supra note 161, at 47.
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The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1003(a), 111 Stat. 788 (1997).
249
See supra note 178, at 28 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-148, at 451-55(1997)).
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The taxpayer also observed that the reference in the legislative history
to U.S. Freight Co. v. United States250 is proof that Congress envisioned
that section 1234A continue to target derivatives because:
The stock example used by Congress solely involved a contract to
purchase stock, and not the direct ownership of the stock itself. Had
Congress intended to cover the termination of direct ownership of stock,
one has to presume Congress would have provided an example of a
termination of direct ownership. 251
While the foregoing is hyperbole on the part of the taxpayer, absent a
clear indication that the text of the statute did not mirror Congressional
objectives, I believe one should be reticent to assume the latter.252 If the
language did not reflect what it intended, why wasn’t it amended through
a technical correction or otherwise? Furthermore, regulations should have
been promulgated incorporating the Service’s interpretation of section
1234A to “inherent” rights.253 Additionally, it is certainly not a situation
where “[t]he statutory context . . . clearly indicate[s] that the only sensible,
logical interpretation is a nonliteral interpretation.”254 Finally, as was
discussed, absent the issuance of Revenue Ruling. 93-80, 255 there was,
under my analysis, a statutory vehicle for addressing the abuse in this case
already in place in the form of section 165(g)(1). Thus, while admittedly I
am not free from doubt, I believe Fifth Circuit was correct in finding
section 1234A inapplicable to Pilgrim’s Pride.
With respect to the failure to promulgate regulations under section
1234A, I recognize that the same criticism could be leveled toward my
view that, absent the issuance of Revenue Ruling 93-80,256 a court should
have held the abandonment resulted in a capital loss even prior to Treasury
U.S. Freight Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 887 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
See supra note 178, at 29 (emphasis in the original; footnote omitted) (citing H.R.
Rep. No. 105-148, at 454 (1997); S. Rep. No. 105-33, at 135-36 (1997)).
252
Several commentators, writing both before and after the Fifth Circuit decided
Pilgrim’s Pride indicated they believed § 1234A should not apply to the abandonment of
securities. See, e.g., Michael J. Kliegman and Anna Turkenich, Worthless Stock or
Securities: Timing and Character Issues Revisited, 111 J. TAX’N 70 (2009); Gerald V.
Thomas II, The Art of Abandoning Securities and Taking an Ordinary Loss, 104 J. TAX’N
22 (2006); William M. Funk, Abandonment Doctrine and Its Discontents: Claiming
Ordinary Losses After Pilgrim’s Pride, 31 Real Estate Journal 267 (2015). In a very recent
Tax Notes article, Jasper L. Cummings, Jr. referred to the Service’s interpretation of I.R.C.
§ 1234A in Pilgrim’s Pride as “far-out.” Cummings, supra note 200, at 1469. Nevertheless,
the author was told by one of the smartest tax lawyers in the U.S., whose judgment on
federal income tax matters is impeccable, that in his opinion, the Tax Court’s analysis of
§ 1234A was correct.
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Regulation section 1.165-5(i) becoming legally effective. In my opinion,
the difference is that Treasury Regulation section 165 (g)(1) is silent as to
how the determination of worthlessness is made. In comparison, section
1234A(1) contains the specific condition of there being “a right or
obligation,” a requirement that has not been altered. For section 1234A to
apply to Pilgrim’ s Pride, it is necessary to subscribe to the Tax Court’s
“inherent” right theory,257 compelling one to “tag Congress with an
extravagant preference for the opaque . . . .” 258 This, for me, is a bridge
too far.

IV.

CONCLUSION

There are some lessons that can be gained from studying Pilgrim’s
Pride. While not of major consequence for either of the courts, I believe it
is fair to conclude that Revenue Ruling 93-80259 undercut the Service’s
position that the loss from abandonment of the securities should be
considered as a capital loss pursuant to section 165(g)(1). The Service
needs to be very careful when issuing guidance that can potentially be used
against it in litigation. Furthermore, prior to taking the position in court
that section 1234A addressed “inherent” rights260 such as in Pilgrim’s
Pride, it should have at least promulgated regulations covering this point.
This teaching has application well beyond section 1234A, as shown in
Wright v. Commissioner.261
Pilgrim’s Pride also most importantly illustrates the wisdom of
utilizing a disparity of statutory interpretation methodologies depending
upon the circumstances. As demonstrated by the different approaches that
I believe were proper here for considering the applicability of sections
165(g)(1) and 1234A to Pilgrim’s Pride, distinct circumstances require
discrete approaches to applying a statutory provision to a case. Surely, our
democratic institutions are not put at risk, by foregoing dogmatic
textualism where this would lead to a result where “no conceivable tax
policy . . . supports this interpretation”262 or deeming an abandoned
security to be per se worthless. Restraint, however, from deviating from
the clear language of the text, such as applying section 1234A to inherent
rights, may be in order where there are no overriding reasons not to do so.
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An eclectic utilization of methodologies may be optimal for a court in
arriving at the right conclusion.263

Professor Popkin philosophizes that in “the process of judging . . . there is often no
right answer. The fact that the judge is required to reach a decision by the best possible
method means only that the judge must seek a right answer, not that he or she will be
successful.” See Popkin, note 112, at 76 (emphasis in the original).
263

